Table of Contents

Case Summaries

• Appeals Court Denies Injured Baseball Fan's Claim Against Phillies, City
• Don King Productions Goes Down for the Count in Federal Court
• Court Disposes of Rape Victims' Claims that School Violated Title IX

Articles

• Winslow Accident Refocuses Agents, Teams on Dangerous Activity Clause
• NCAA Seeks Rescinsion DOE's Clarification to Title IX

Briefs

• St. Bonaventure Reaches Settlement With Fired Basketball Coach
• Texas Tech Employee Files Suit Over Alleged Retaliation
• Track Coach Files Gender Bias Suit Against University of Oregon
• Basketball Coach Awarded $540,000 in Racial Case

Calendar

• American Bar Association Forum on the Entertainment and Sports Industries. October 6-8, 2005

Case Summaries

Appeals Court Denies Injured Baseball Fan's Claim Against Phillies, City

A Pennsylvania appeals court has affirmed a trial court's ruling that a patron at a Philadelphia Phillies baseball game who was hit by a foul ball assumed the risk of injury by sitting in unprotected seats.

The appeals court was unreceptive to the plaintiff's argument that the team and the city should have extended the protective netting beyond the area immediately behind home plate.

Neil Pakett, D.M.D., was attending a Phillies game in Veterans Stadium on January 25, 2001. His seat, which he had occupied before, was located behind home plate, toward third base. During the game, a foul ball was hit toward Pakett, who tried to catch the ball with his bare hand. Pakett was not able to make the play and the ball struck him in the eye, causing temporary blindness and requiring surgery. Pakett still has not regained all of his vision.

Pakett sued the City of Philadelphia and the Phillies, claiming that they shared responsibility for the condition and safety of Veterans Stadium and that his "injuries and damages were a direct and proximate result of (their) negligence in failing to erect and maintain a backstop that was adequate to protect spectators in certain seats, thereby exposing those spectators to a dangerous condition and an unreasonable risk of harm."

The defendants moved for summary judgment, which the court grated, applying the "no-duty" rule, that neither the City nor the Phillies had a duty to protect Pakett from, or warn Pakett of, the risk of being struck by a foul ball while he was sitting in the stands watching a game.

The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the court failed to recognize that the defendants breached their duty "as operators of a baseball stadium to properly construct and maintain a backstop that would provide adequate protection and would allow time for a person to respond to foul balls in an area of the stadium where foul balls occur with great frequency, speed and force."

Pakett's argument centered in large part on Jones v. Three Rivers Management Corporation, 483 Pa. 75, 394 A.2d 546 (1978), in which the state's supreme court discussed the "no-duty" rule applicable to spectator sports, but declined to apply it.

"In that case, Evelyn Jones filed suit in negligence for injuries suffered after she was struck by a foul ball during pre-game batting practice at Three Rivers Stadium," wrote the court. "At the time, Jones was properly using an interior walkway behind the stands at the stadium. The court first recognized that an operator of a place of amusement is not an insurer of his patrons and, therefore, will be liable for injuries to his patrons only where he fails to use reasonable care in the construction, maintenance, and management of the facility, having regard to the character of the exhibitions given and the customary conduct of patrons invited."

Critical to the applicability of that case, according to the instant court, is that the plaintiff introduce "adequate evidence that the amusement facility in which he was injured deviated in some relevant respect from established custom will it be proper for an 'inherent-risk' case to go to the jury." Id. at 84, 394 A.2d at 550.

The Jones court concluded that the "'no-duty' rule, ordinarily applicable to patrons seated in the stands of the ballpark, should not be extended to a situation where a plaintiff was struck by a batted baseball while standing in an interior walkway of the stadium since the risk of harm in viewing the field from the concourse area could not be characterized as 'part of the spectator sport of baseball.' Id. at 86-87, 394 A.2d at 552."

On appeal in the instant case, the plaintiff argued that the trial court "mischaracterized the unreasonable and extraordinary nature of the risk to which Pakett was exposed" because his action, like the plaintiff in Jones, was "based on an alleged construction defect, i.e., a backstop configuration that did not comply with applicable engineering principles and did not afford spectators in dangerous locations adequate protection or sufficient response time to either catch or move away from the a foul ball."

In disagreeing with his argument, the court wrote that Pakett did not satisfy his burden of showing that "the danger was not an 'inherent risk' of the game of baseball or that the backstop in Veterans Stadium deviated in some relevant way from the established custom in ballparks.

"Whereas the plaintiff in Jones was injured before the start of the game and was neither in close proximity to the playing field nor cognizant of the risk involved, Pakett was struck during the course of a game, while sitting near the playing surface in a seat that he had occupied on other occasions. Pakett was well aware that foul balls entered this particular area from the playing field several times during a single game; in fact, persons in his party brought mitts to the game hoping to catch one of these balls. Indeed, when the ball came toward Pakett, he did not try to avoid it but attempted to catch it. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit noted, "The risk of being ... hit, with a chance to catch the foul and keep the ball, is one of the exciting thrills of attendance at the game. The fan cannot recover if the ball hits him instead of his catching it." Boynton v. Ryan, 257 F.2d 70, 71 (3rd Cir. 1958).

"Further, the argument that Pakett relied on the protection of the backstop is unavailing. By placing the protective screen behind home plate, Appellees did not assume a duty to use reasonable care with respect to the design of the barrier beyond seeing that it did not deviate from the established customs used in baseball stadiums. To conclude otherwise would lead [*14] to absurd results in that it would require an amusement facility to have screens encircling the entire field, see Romeo, or, alternatively, would allow an amusement facility to avoid liability by leaving stands unprotected, but expose the facility to liability when it erects protective barriers. See Petrongola v. Comcast-Spectacor, L.P., 2001 PA Super 338, 789 A.2d 204 (Pa. Super. 2001), appeal denied, 569 Pa. 694, 803 A.2d 736 (2002)."

Neil Pakett, D.M.D. et al. v. The Phillies, L.P. et al.; Common. Ct. Pa.; No. 2468 C.D. 2004, No. 2498 C.D. 2004; 3/29/05

Attorneys of Record: Miriam A. Newman, Philadelphia, for appellants. Robert J. Foster, King of Prussia, for appellee, The Phillies, L.P., John J. Hare, Philadelphia, for appellee, The City of Philadelphia.

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Don King Productions Goes Down for the Count in Federal Court

A federal judge in the Southern District of New York has handed a defeat to Don King Productions (DKP), which had sued a rival boxing promoter over the contractual rights to promote middle weight champion Bernard Hopkins, Jr.'s future bouts.

Specifically, the court dismissed King's claim for declaratory judgment, concluding that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the case. King had argued that a letter written by Hopkins' counsel, Arnold Joseph, to the in-house counsel for DKP, John S. Wirt, constituted a threat to "bring a damages action against DKP," pursuant to the Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act, and conferred federal jurisdiction.

The court wrote that "DKP must do more than establish that Hopkins had the right to file a federal claim and possessed a viable legal argument upon which to base that claim; DKP must show that it instituted its action because of Hopkins' threat of a federal lawsuit."

Underlying the dispute was the requirement in boxing that the champion in a particular weight division has to defend his title by fighting an opponent, known as the "mandatory challenger," every nine months. At such point, the promoters of the champion and the challenger attempt to negotiate a deal for the championship bout. If no agreement can be reached within a set period of time, the sanctioning organization will order a "purse bid," which opens the fight to any promoter, who offers the highest bid. If the champion refuses to participate in the mandatory bout following the purse bid, the organization will strip him of his title.

Hopkins entered into an agreement with DKP in January 2001, which provided that Hopkins would receive certain minimum purses for bouts against opponents designated by DKP. Nevertheless, DKP did not exercise the option to stage Hopkins' fights, via the contract, opting instead to rely on the "purse bid" route.

Both parties continued along this path, until Hopkins agreed in September 2004 to fight Oscar de la Hoya without consulting with DKP, in contravention of the exclusive options provision it had with DKP, which was effective until at least March 2005. In November 2004, DKP informed both Hopkins and Golden Boy Productions (GBP) by letter that it was exercising its option rights under the agreement it had with Hopkins, and advised GBP that a promotional agreement between Hopkins and GBP would constitute tortious interference with its contract.

At that point, Joseph wrote the aforementioned letter, claiming the options in the contract had been rendered void by the Ali Act, which prohibits a promoter from requiring a boxer to grant him any future promotional rights as a condition for participating in a mandatory sanctioned bout.

DKP sued on December 9, 2004, alleging that: (1) it is entitled to a judgment declaring that its contract with Hopkins is not rendered unenforceable by Section 6307b(b) of the Ali Act; (2) Hopkins breached the contract; and (3) GBP tortiously interfered with the contract.

In parallel, GBP filed suit against DKP in California state court seeking a judgment declaring that the contract is invalid and unenforceable and the agreement with GBP is valid and enforceable. That action was removed to federal court by DKP and was transferred to the federal court by motion of DKP. Ultimately, GBP voluntarily dismissed the California action before DKP filed an answer.

The federal court in the instant opinion considered Hopkins' Rule 12(b)(1) Motions to Dismiss

"DKP simply overreaches in claiming that this letter contains the threat of a federal lawsuit," wrote the court.

"A reasonable interpretation of Mr. Joseph's letter, considered within the larger context of the case, suggests that DKP's petition for declaratory judgment resembles an opening round uppercut more than a defensive counterpunch. It is apparent that the purpose of DKP's suit is to recover damages from Hopkins and GBP for their allegedly tortious conduct, not to seek relief from the threat of impending litigation. While Hopkins clearly threatened to bring suit against DKP if DKP contacted any entities with which Hopkins associated, it appears that the threatened action would have been grounded in state tort law, not the Ali Act.

"Accordingly, because any claims threatened by defendants were state tort claims, DKP's first cause of action for declaratory judgment does not confer subject matter jurisdiction upon this Court. Because the Court dismisses DKP's declaratory judgment claim, the Court must also dismiss DKP's remaining state claims." Don King Productions v. Bernard Hopkins, Jr. et al.; S.D.N.Y; 04 Civ. 9705 (PKL); 5/4/05

Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiff) Peter B. Schalk, Esq. of Judd Burstein, P.C., New York, New York. (for defendant Bernard Hopkins, Jr.) Katherine L. Pringle, Esq. of Friedman Kaplan Seiler & Adelman LLP, New York, New York and Michael S. Olin, Esq. of Podhurst Orseck, P.A., Miami, Florida. (for defendant Golden Boy Promotions, Inc.) Steven M. Hayes, Esq. of Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP, New York, New York.

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Court Disposes of Rape Victims' Claims that School Violated Title IX

A federal judge has granted the University of Colorado's motion for summary judgment in a case where two sexual assault victims had sued the school for violating Title IX by fostering a hostile environment that enabled the rapists.

Significant to the court's conclusion was its finding that the university was not "deliberately indifferent to the risk that CU football players and recruits would sexually assault female University students as part of the recruiting program, including the risk that those assaults would be aided or exacerbated by excessive alcohol use by female students, football players, and recruits."

The incident, which occurred on December 7, 2001, was arranged by an athletic department tutor, who knew that several female students had planned a "girls' night in" party at one of the plaintiff's apartments. The tutor arranged to have UC football players and recruits stop by the house for the opportunity to have sex with the women. The sexual assaults occurred when the women became too intoxicated to resist the sexual advances of the men.

The plaintiffs sued, claiming "the practices of the CU Athletic Department and football program had created a known risk of sexual harassment, sexual assaults, and sexual discrimination against female students and other women by football players and recruits." Further, they alleged that the assaults they suffered on December 7, 2001, "are part of the sexual harassment and assaults of which CU had actual knowledge and to which it was deliberately indifferent."

Relying on Murrell v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 186 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 1999) and Davis as Next Friend LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 641 (1999), the district judge in the instant case concluded that the plaintiffs must allege and prove by a preponderance of the evidence the following five essential elements to establish their Title IX claim:

1. that the University had actual knowledge of sexual harassment of female CU students by football players and recruits as a part of the football recruiting program;

2. that the University was deliberately indifferent to this known sexual harassment of female CU students by football players and recruits as a part of the football recruiting program;

3. that the plaintiffs were subjected to severe, pervasive and objectively offensive sexual harassment caused by the University's deliberate indifference to known sexual harassment;

4. that the harassment occurred in the context of an educational activity; and

5. that the harassment had the systemic effect of depriving plaintiff of access to educational benefits or opportunities.

After a lengthy exploration of the first question, the court found that "relevant CU officials were aware of some incidents of sexual harassment, sexual assaults, and alcohol use by certain identified football players and football recruits over a period spanning approximately four years preceding the plaintiffs' assaults.

"Considered as a whole, however, all of the relevant information known to the CU officials did not constitute adequate notice, under Title IX, that female CU students, including the plaintiffs, faced a risk that CU football players and recruits would sexually assault female University students as part of the recruiting program, including the risk that those assaults would be aided or exacerbated by excessive alcohol use by players, recruits, and female students.

"Absent sufficient evidence that the University was on notice of this risk, the plaintiffs cannot prove their Title IX claim against the University," held the court.

Turning to the second question about whether the university was deliberately indifferent to a known risk, the court found that "absent sufficient evidence that the University had sufficient notice of the relevant risk, or that the University acted with deliberate indifference with regard to that risk, a reasonable fact finder could not conclude that the University's deliberate indifference caused the plaintiffs to suffer the severe sexual harassment they suffered. Accordingly, evidence that the University exhibited deliberate indifference after the key discriminatory event at issue does not tend to show that the University's deliberate indifference caused the severe sexual harassment suffered by the plaintiffs."

The judge's decision was warmly embraced by the defendants, including the University's outgoing Pesident, Betsy Hoffman, who told the Denver Rocky Mountain News that the ruling shows that "this university has never acted with indifference toward its students.

"We have always cared deeply for our students and have worked hard to create a supportive environment in which they can learn," she added. "While we are pleased by today's ruling, we want to be clear that our commitment to women, victims' rights and victims' assistance remains steadfast."

In contrast, the American Association of University Women (AAUW) Legal Advocacy Fund expressed its disappointment with the ruling.

"In this case, and in independent reports and investigations, it has been demonstrated that over the course of many years CU has fostered a sexually hostile environment and chosen not to address and remedy it any meaningful way," said Leslie T. Annexstein, director of the AAUW Legal Advocacy Fund. "The court's decision sends the discouraging message to other campus women who may be in a similar situation that proving your case may be an uphill battle."

She added that "in light of the multitude of incidents at CU over many years, it is clear that something is still very wrong at CU."

Simpson et al v. University of Colorado, Boulder et al.; D.Colo.; Civil Case No. 02-RB-2390 (CBS)(consolidated with 03-RB-2495 (CBS));3/31/05

Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiffs) Baine P. Kerr, Christopher Wallace Ford, and Kimberly M. Hult of Hutchinson, Black and Cook LLC, Boulder, CO. and John A. Culver and Seth J. Benezra of Benezra & Culver, LLC, Lakewood, CO. (for defendants) Kay J. Rice of Cooper & Clough, Denver, CO, Larry S. Pozner of Hoffman, Reilly, Pozner & Williamson, L.L.P., Denver, CO, Michael W. Schreiner of University of Colorado, Office of University Counsel, Denver, CO, and Stephen S. Dunham of Morrison & Foerster-Colorado, Denver, CO.

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Articles

Winslow Accident Refocuses Agents, Teams on Dangerous Activity Clause

The clock is ticking on Kellen Winslow, Jr., the gifted young tight end of the Cleveland Browns, who last month injured himself in a motorcycle accident.

If the Browns choose the course taken by the Chicago Bulls involving their star point guard Jay Williams, it could be a very expensive ride. When Williams injured himself in a motorcycle accident, the Bulls honored one year of his contract and then settled on the remaining two years.

NFL contracts contain a standard clause forbidding players from taking part in any activity "which may involve a significant risk of personal injury."

More than likely, the Browns will not rush to any decision, Oakland Raiders attorney Jeff Birren recently told Sports Litigation Alert. "History suggests that the Browns will sit tight, and see if he recovers," said Birren. "If he does not, it should lead players to change their off-field behavior."

Presenting another perspective is Adam Heller, an agent with BDB Sports & Entertainment, who has represented almost two dozen draft picks in his practice. Heller took time out recently to answer questions from Sports Litigation Alert about the Winslow incident. The interview follows.

Is it standard to have a "dangerous activity" clause in a player's contract?

"In the NFL, the standard player contract includes language that prohibits the player from engaging in activities (other than playing football for the players' team) which may involve a significant risk of injury to that player. However, other compensation beyond base salaries (including signing bonuses, roster bonuses and even incentives) can be tied to language that includes some form of 'dangerous activity' clause. These clauses are common, but less standardized in form.

"Generally, whenever a team is making a significant investment into a player, they want to protect their investment as much as possible and make sure that their players are not putting the ability to perform under the contract at risk."

What is the negotiation around this term (prohibited activities, renumeration etc.?)?

"While not always possible, I try to negotiate as much gray out of the 'dangerous activity' portion of the agreement as possible. If a client knows exactly what he/she can or cannot do, it makes it much easier to comply. As mentioned above, the 'significant risk of injury' activity is not clearly defined and it is difficult to say whether certain activities fall in that category. Also, remuneration is a big part of these clauses. Teams will try to insert language that allows them to recoup the most money in case of a breach, including past and future earnings. Thus, if an athlete misses a single practice or game because of an injury resulting from a prohibited 'dangerous activity,' he/she could be forced to pay back an entire signing bonus or even future bonuses. From an agent's perspective, it is important to negotiate 'pro-rata' language that limits the payback to the number of games the athlete misses because of the injury."

What advice do you give players, who have signed a contract with such a clause?

"I make sure the client understands every word in their player contract, and that they appreciate the consequences of breaching any of its terms. My advice is to stay as far away from any activity that would even come close to triggering the prohibited conduct clause in their contract. Professional athletes must remember that in their profession, the athletes' tremendous and unique physical skill and ability are what allow them to earn a nice living, and they must take care of their bodies in order to maintain that lifestyle. If a client still needs an adrenaline rush - condition and train harder."

Is there, should there be concern about fraud in the aftermath of an injury that occurred when a player has participated in a prohibited activity?

"With the amount of money at stake in these situations, fraud can be a concern - and the issue has come up in these situations. When two parties come to an agreement, you like to think that each is operating in good faith under the terms. However, if one party does not feel the other is being forthright, they certainly would have the ability to conduct an investigation."

How broad do these clauses go in terms of prohibited activities (no basketball, etc.)?

"The clauses can go as broad as the imagination of the team and can be tailored to the specific player if the team is aware of and would like to prohibit an activity in which a player likes to participate. These activities can include basketball, skydiving, skiing, motorcycling, snowboarding, etc."

How will the Winslow case affect the recognition of this issue by players and teams, in your opinion?

"Anytime an unfortunate situation like the Winslow case occurs, it brings this issue to the forefront and provides a very real example for discussion between agents and their clients, and by the teams, who are looking for the best way to protect their investment. In this regard, I think in the near future, some athletes will think twice before engaging in certain activities. However, the reality is that professional athletes are ultra-competitive, often feel invincible, and are willing to put their bodies at risk - all qualities that help make them great athletes. Thus, the Winslow case is history repeating itself, and it is bound to happen again - which is why teams will continue to insist on the "dangerous activity" clauses and professional athletes need to make smart decisions about the activities in which they choose to participate."

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NCAA Seeks Rescinsion DOE's Clarification to Title IX

The NCAA Executive Committee passed a resolution last month urging the U.S. Department of Education and federal policymakers to rescind its Additional Clarification for Title IX, and instead "honor the Department's 2003 commitment to strongly enforce the standards of long-standing Title IX athletics policies, including the 1996 Clarification."

The Committee also urged NCAA members to decline use of the procedures set forth in the March 17, 2005 Additional Clarification.

The NCAA resolution was unanimously approved by the Division I, II and III governance structures this afternoon in meetings held at the NCAA national office.

"The Executive Committee looked at the fact that the resolution was unanimously supported by our governance structures, which speaks to our beliefs and our values in the support of women and their athletic opportunities," said NCAA Executive Committee chair Carol Cartwright, president of Kent State University. "The resolution reaffirms our strong commitment to the enforcement of Title IX policies on our member institution campuses."

"We're deeply committed to the principles of Title IX and we want to make sure that those opportunities for women are preserved," said Division I Board of Directors chair Robert Hemenway, chancellor of the University of Kansas. "We've made progress over the years with Title IX and we want to ensure that progress continues."

The NCAA Executive Committee Resolution reads as follows:

Whereas the U.S. Department of Education, without notice or opportunity for public input, issued an "Additional Clarification of Intercollegiate Athletics Policy: Three-Part Test – Prong Three," on March 17, 2005, which Clarification allows schools to gauge female students' interest in athletics under the third prong of the three-part test by conducting an e-mail survey and further allows schools to treat a lack of response to the survey as a lack of interest in playing additional sports;

Whereas the Additional Clarification is inconsistent with the 1996 Clarification and with basic principles of equity under Title IX because it, among other problems (a) permits schools to use surveys alone, rather than the factors set forth in the 1996 Clarification, as a means to assess female students' interest in sports; (b) conflicts with a key purpose of Title IX – to encourage women's interest in sports and eliminate stereotypes that discourage them from participating; (c) allows schools to restrict surveys to enrolled and admitted students, thereby permitting them to evade their legal obligation to measure interest broadly; (d) authorizes a flawed survey methodology; (e) shifts the burden to female students to show that they are entitled to equal opportunity; and (f) makes no provision for the Department of Education to monitor schools' implementation of the survey or its results;

Whereas for these reasons, the Additional Clarification provides the opportunity to evade the legal obligation to provide equal opportunity in sports and violates the Department's 2003 commitment to strongly enforce long-standing Title IX standards;

Now, therefore, be it RESOLVED that:

NCAA members are urged to decline use of the procedures set forth in the March 17, 2005, Additional Clarification and abide by the standards of the 1996 Clarification to evaluate women's interest in sports under the third prong of the three-part test, which standards anticipate the use of a multiplicity of tools and analyses to measure that interest;

The NCAA Executive Committee, on behalf of its members, urges the Department of Education and federal policymakers to rescind the Additional Clarification and to honor the Department's 2003 commitment to strongly enforce the standards of long-standing Title IX athletics policies, including the 1996 Clarification.

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Briefs

St. Bonaventure Reaches Settlement With Fired Basketball Coach

Officials at St. Bonaventure University have reached a settlement with the school's former men's basketball coach Jan van Breda Kolff, who filed a $21 million wrongful termination lawsuit against the school in 2004. In a statement, school officials said the settlement was reached with assistance from U.S. Magistrate Judge Victor Bianchini of San Diego, and that van Breda Kolff's lawsuit will be dismissed following satisfaction of the terms of the undisclosed settlement, which both parties agreed to keep confidential. St. Bonaventure's costs related to the settlement will be covered by an insurance carrier, according to the statement. Van Breda Kolff, who had four years and $900,000 remaining on a six-year deal, was fired amid the 2003 scandal involving the school's use of an ineligible player during the 2002-2003 basketball season. Following an investigation, junior college transfer Jamil Terrell was declared ineligible by the NCAA for failing to meet certain NCAA requirements, which forced the school to forfeit six conference wins and barred it from postseason play. Following an internal investigation St. Bonaventure officials fired van Breda Kolff, ruling that he should have known about the player's ineligibility. The former coach argued that the school's interim president and NCAA compliance officer made false and damaging statements about him in the months following the scandal. He also claimed that he played no part in the scandal, which eventually led to the basketball program being placed on three years probation by the NCAA. In its final report, the NCAA did not cite van Breda Kolff for any violations.

Another lawsuit involving the same scandal, however, is still pending. Former St. Bonaventure athletic director Gothard Lane is suing the school for libel, and is seeking $3 million in damages. Lane, who was forced to resign in the midst of the scandal's investigation, claims school officials made inaccurate statements to the media regarding his role in the situation.

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Texas Tech Employee Files Suit Over Alleged Retaliation

A former Texas Tech athletic administrator has alleged she was passed over for a promotion and later demoted after reporting what she thought were improprieties within the school's athletic department. Natalie Steadman, who was once Texas Tech's head athletic trainer and assistant athletic director of sports medicine, claims in the lawsuit that she informed athletic director Gerald Myers in the spring of 2000 that a football trainer hired by Tech football coach Mike Leach was not properly licensed to perform his duties, a claim she also reported to the state's licensing board. She also reported to Myers that other trainers in the program were illegally dispensing prescription medication without a physician's approval. The lawsuit claims that two team physicians resigned in protest as a result of the violations and Myers' refusal to address the problem. Steadman claims in the lawsuit that Tech retaliated against her when she applied for the position of associate athletic director for sports medicine but did not get the job. The person eventually hired for the position, Ken Murray, got a four-year contract paying $125,000 per year, or roughly $50,000 more than she made in a similar position with the same job description, Steadman said. According to the lawsuit, Murray eventually informed Steadman that her duties and title were being taken away from her, and two months later told her that the reasoning behind the move was her uncooperativeness in reporting the two instances.

Steadman seeks a jury trial and actual damages from lost wages from the job she was allegedly passed over.

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Track Coach Files Gender Bias Suit Against University of Oregon

Long-time University of Oregon assistant coach Sally Harmon has rejected a reported six-figure settlement in her gender bias lawsuit against the school, and the matter now appears headed to the state's court system. According to published news reports and the lawsuit, Harmon's suit stems from a series of events during her 18-year tenure at the school, culminating when she was let go by UO athletic director Bill Moos when Moos merged the men's and women's track programs after the 2003 season. Moos' action came despite Harmon's considerable achievements with the UO women's track and field program, including having personally coached 17 All-Americans and three of the six UO women who won NCAA outdoor event titles between 1986 and 2003. Instead, the lawsuit said, Moos hired Olympic silver medalist Lance Deal, who had garnered international acclaim as a competitor but had no significant coaching experience. And, according to Harmon's suit, that was only the end of the beginning. Harmon was also the lowest paid assistant – and the only woman – in either the men's or women's track and field program for much of her time at UO. She contends that it wasn't until her refusal in 2000 to sign a contract that would have paid her approximately $14,000 less than the lowest-paid male assistant did school officials bring her salary up to par with other department employees.

In addition, she had also remained the only full-time assistant in the school's track and field program without use of an athletic department courtesy car. According to published new reports, Harmon's attorneys have already turned down a settlement offer in the neighborhood of $150,000, reportedly about $600,000 shy of the figure they first had in mind.

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Basketball Coach Awarded $540,000 in Racial Case

Former Cal State Stanislaus men's basketball coach Mike Terpstra was recently awarded $540,000 by a California jury which found that race played a role in the school's decision to not renew his contract after the 2002-03 season. Terpstra, who is white and currently the coach at Idaho's Northwest Nazarene, contended that CSS officials, specifically the school's board of trustees, wanted to hire a black coach. The school eventually hired another white coach, Keith Larsen, but Terpstra argued that the university changed its mind about hiring a black coach in the wake of publicity generated by the lawsuit.

A California jury agreed with Terpstra, awarding him $40,000 for past economic loss, $300,000 for future economic loss and $200,000 for pain and suffering. The decision can be appealed. Terpstra was at CSS for three years and finished with a record of 18-11 in the 2002-03 season. He is currently mulling over a new contract offer from NMU, where he just completed his first full season as head coach at the Division II school. The Crusaders finished with a 17-10 record and won nine of their last 10 games.

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Calendar

October 6-8, 2005

American Bar Association Forum on the Entertainment and Sports Industries In New York City. For more information, contact Dawn Holiday at the ABA at holidayd@staff.abanet.org

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